It was anticipated that the mandatory National Identification Number-SIM linking policy, which was implemented by the federal government in 2020, would revolutionize Nigeria’s battle against insecurity.
Authorities thought that by associating each SIM card with a validated identification, anonymous communications used by criminals would be eliminated.
However, terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom continue to be among the nation’s greatest security threats six years later, sparking a fresh discussion about the NIN-SIM policy’s effectiveness in preventing crime.
After Abisoye Coker-Odusote, Director-General of the National identification Management Commission (NIMC), explained why terrorists and kidnappers are not always traceable despite the nation’s growing digital identification infrastructure, the topic came up again.
During a monitored appearance on Sunday Politics on Channels Television, Coker-Odusote stated that thieves often obstruct investigations by utilizing their victims’ cell phones rather than their own registered lines.
“We already know that the NIN is the fundamental identification for the security architecture, yet you frequently discover that the kidnappers utilize the victims’ phones. So, because they aren’t using their own phones, how can you track them down?” she said.
She added that Nigeria’s identity database might not even include all of the criminal components involved in abduction operations.
According to a belief, it’s probable that these kidnappers are not Nigerians and are brought into the nation 48 or 72 hours prior to the actual kidnapping. They would obviously not be included in our database if that were the case, but I’m not implying anything,” she continued.
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The remarks have raised concerns about whether the NIN-SIM linkage has lived up to expectations beyond what the system was intended to provide.
In order to improve identity management, do away with anonymous SIM ownership, and promote national security, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) and NIMC launched the NIN-SIM linking program.
Millions of customers linked their SIM cards to their NIDs as a result of the exercise over time, and telecom companies canceled millions of lines that did not adhere to regulations.
The NCC had previously insisted that the policy was intended to increase identity verification, facilitate security authorities in criminal investigations, and enhance the integrity of Nigeria’s SIM registration database.
The exercise is a crucial part of the nation’s digital economy and national security framework, according to the regulator.
Telecommunications companies have consistently insisted that they are not in charge of tracking criminals, even though they are essential to the implementation of the NIN-SIM linking policy.
Gbenga Adebayo, Chairman of the Association of Licensed Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria (ALTON), repeatedly clarified during the exercise’s nationwide execution that telecom operators only carry out the NCC’s directives, with the NIMC handling identity verification and validation.
He claims that while operators provide subscriber data for verification, the NIMC platform is where National Identity Number authentication actually takes place. Before impacted subscribers can be cleared in cases of delays or unsuccessful validations, operators rely on NIMC’s responses.
Adebayo had also mentioned that the main goals of the NIN-SIM harmonization operation were to reduce the use of anonymously registered phone lines for illegal activities and to sanitize the subscriber database by guaranteeing that each active SIM is linked to a verified identity.
His stance emphasized the difference between identifying the person behind a SIM card and security services’ duty to use available intelligence and telecommunications data to look into crimes.
The NIMC’s most recent explanation supported the commission’s long-standing stance that the NIN is essentially an identity management system rather than a stand-alone surveillance platform, even if it acknowledged some of the practical constraints facing investigators.
Numerous public and commercial sector activities, such as banking, passport applications, driver’s license processing, telecommunications services, and access to other government programs, use the National Identification Number as a distinct digital identity.
According to Coker-Odusote, cooperation between security agencies, telecom companies, and other pertinent organizations is just as important to the system’s ability to prevent crime as identity verification.
Rotimi Akapo, a telecom lawyer and regulatory specialist, agrees, saying that assumptions regarding the NIN-SIM connectivity have frequently been misinterpreted.
Akapo claims that rather than acting as a stand-alone remedy for Nigeria’s security issues, the project was primarily created to address an identity verification issue by guaranteeing that each SIM card is connected to a verifiable individual.
He stated that although the policy increases accountability within the telecommunications ecosystem, identity theft, fraudulently registered SIM cards, proxy registrations, and other vulnerabilities can still be exploited by criminals if security agencies are unable to effectively use available intelligence. “NIN-SIM linkage solves an identity problem, not a crime problem,” he said.
His perspective is consistent with the overarching goal of the Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative, which is funded by the World Bank and defines digital identification as the fundamental infrastructure that allows individuals to demonstrate their identity in order to obtain services from the public and private sectors. In that context, security is not the only goal of the national identity system, but rather one of many use cases.
The remarks support the claim that although the NIN-SIM linkage has greatly improved subscriber identity verification, successful criminal investigations based on identity data require efficient cooperation between telecom companies, security agencies, and other organizations within Nigeria’s security architecture.
The most recent rationale is given in the context of ongoing kidnapping cases in various regions of the nation despite the NIN-SIM policy’s widespread deployment.
Many Nigerians anticipated that it would be simpler to locate and capture criminals using mobile phones to negotiate ransom payments as a result of the required connection activity.
Security operations, however, are frequently more complicated.
Subscriber records would naturally identify the victim rather than the abductor if kidnappers used the victims’ phones during ransom discussions. Investigators must integrate identify information with other intelligence tools and operational capabilities in such circumstances.
In a same vein, the NIN cannot prove the identities of members of criminal networks who are not registered in Nigeria’s identification database without additional security and immigration intelligence.
The National Identification Number is intended to serve as Nigeria’s fundamental digital identity system, going beyond security.
Foundational identity systems are platforms that allow people to safely prove who they are in order to access public and private sector services, according to the World Bank-backed Identification for Development (ID4D) program, which has helped Nigeria expand its digital identification.
The NIN is now the foundation for identity verification in Nigeria’s banking, telecommunications, passport applications, tax administration, social intervention programs, and other government services. Rather than being the platform’s exclusive goal, security is one of many potential uses.
The effectiveness of the NIN-SIM linkage in combating kidnapping or terrorism ultimately depends on how well identity information is integrated with law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and other national security systems, according to this broader mandate, even though it can strengthen accountability by linking every active SIM card with a verified identity.
The government’s recent initiatives show that the identification ecosystem is still developing.
President Bola Tinubu has instructed NIMC to expedite Nigerians’ enrollment in the national identification database, citing digital identity as essential to planning, governance, and service provision.
Coker-Odusote claims that the commission is bolstering biometric verification throughout government services and increasing membership through collaborations under the Identification for Development (ID4D) program, which is funded by the World Bank. Additionally, she said that during SIM registration, telecom companies now instantly verify facial biometrics against the NIMC database.
The most recent discussion emphasizes a crucial contrast between identity management and crime prevention as Nigeria works to improve its digital public infrastructure.
The NIN-SIM linking has decreased anonymous SIM ownership and greatly enhanced subscriber identification verification. However, the continued prevalence of kidnapping indicates that sophisticated criminal activity cannot be prevented by digital identification alone.
Instead, how well identification information is integrated with intelligence collecting, telecommunications data, law enforcement activities, and other components of Nigeria’s larger security architecture will ultimately determine how effective it is.